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Managing Regulatory
Arbitrage:
an alternative to harmonization
Excerpt from a forthcoming research article for Cornell International Law Journal (2014).

Annelise Riles walks us
through a conflict of laws
approach to financial regulation.

A

merican International Group (AIG), the
very name of this company screams out its
US origins. And yet, the traders within the UK
subsidiary of this multinational insurance corporation,
operating under a French banking licence, were
able to engage in risk-taking activities that were
largely beyond the reach of US insurance and finance
regulators. When AIG’s London-based trades fell
apart in 2008, the parent institution in the US – and
hence the US taxpayers – found themselves on the
hook for decisions made in AIG’s overseas subsidiary.
In the world of financial regulation, national financial
regulators are pit against a globally mobile financial
system. Since 2008, regulators have made a
concerted effort to address the national regulatory
differences that made AIG’s trades possible in the
first place. New rules hammered out at the G20 that
seek to address these challenges apply to banks.
How have the markets responded? Financiers have
simply found ways of booking their transactions
through non-bank institutions, the shadow banks
not subject to the G20’s rules.
The regulatory challenge posed by both AIG and
the shadow banking industry is of paramount
importance because the international slipperiness
of these institutions, which are beyond the reach
of regulators, threatens the sovereignty of nationstates and the well-being of national economies.
However, the tension between regulators and
financiers is somewhat more complicated than
the law makers versus law evaders dichotomy.
This is because a patchy regulatory landscape is
fully anticipated within the core business model
of global finance.

Playing regulatory differences is an
important way of generating financial advantage.
The technical term for this is “regulator y
arbitrage”.
In economic theory ‘arbitrage’ is considered a
significant activity quite distinct from its lesser cousin,
‘speculation’. Indeed, arbitrage is one of the great
singular achievements of economic thought.
The general art of arbitrage is to spot similarities
across what look like differences at first glance: a
basket of stocks and an index, the rules of one legal
system and those of another. From the perspective
of economic theory, the investment strategy behind
regulatory arbitrage is exactly the same as in other
kinds of arbitrage in which an investment opportunity
is created by a discrepancy in the relative price of
two investments otherwise deemed similar. So
what’s the problem with regulatory arbitrage? For
one, it can create a race to the bottom as investors
move their transactions to the locality with the most
favourable rules.
The prevailing wisdom is that regulatory arbitrage can
be counteracted only if the rules across all legal systems
are harmonized. In other words, regulatory arbitrage
opportunities will be eliminated if the regulatory cost of
transacting is identical in all places. In practice, however,
changing national laws is an extremely contentious
process. Attempts to universalize substantive regulation
can quickly devolve into regulatory nationalism as
domestic political and economic interests clash with
international expectations. What is more, the process
of harmonization risks creating new regulatory arbitrage
opportunities since the pace of enacting legal change
will differ across states.
What if international regulatory harmonization at
the level of nation-states is an unattainable goal?
What non-lawyers may not know is that the law
is equipped with sophisticated tools for dealing
with persistent regulatory differences – tools like
“party autonomy in choice of law”, the rule that

says parties get to pick the law that applies to
their contracts. However, as discussed in my book
Collateral Knowledge (2011), the rules we currently
use favour the financial industry. The industry has
worked hard to ensure that judges and academics
who make these rules see things its way.
The tool I’m thinking of is a technical and
arcane, but ingenious invention known as Conflict
of Laws within common law, or “private international
law” in civil law. Conflict of Laws is the name given
to the well established body of law that determines
which law should apply in situations where more
than one sovereign state can arguably lay claim to a
problem. For example: What law governs a contract
between a bank in London and another bank in the
Cayman Islands concerning assets in Singapore, and
executed over the Internet? The answer is found in
the Conflict of Laws.
Unlike the harmonization paradigm which pursues
legal uniformity, the “conflicts approach” accepts
that regulatory nationalism is a fact of life, and sets for
itself the more modest goal of achieving coordination
among different national regimes. This alternative
approach to international regulatory coordination
originated to stabilize trade relations after the fall
of the Roman Empire and has thus developed
over centuries.
Under the conflicts approach the point is not to define
one set of rules that apply for all, as is the case in public
international law –the law of international organizations
such as the UN or the WTO. Rather, it is simply to define
under which circumstance should a particular dispute
or problem be subject to one state’s law or another.
Thinking in terms of ‘conflict of laws’ changes the
debate over global financial regulation because it
raises an altogether different set of questions that are
largely being ignored. For example: How far does each
regulatory jurisdiction extend, and what should be
done when there is overlap? When should so-called
host regulators of a global, systemically important

Playing regulatory differences is an important
way of generating financial advantage. The
technical term for this is ‘regulatory arbitrage’.
financial institution defer to so-called home regulators?
Thinking about conflicts between laws encourages
us to more carefully examine how we allocate
authority across the existing regulatory regimes.
The approach gives us another way of examining,
and therefore of challenging, the scope of national,
international, and non-state regulation. After all,
when regulators or market participants make a
claim about the application of one or another body
of laws to a given party or transaction, they are
effectively making an implicit claim about what the
scope of their national law should be.
The highly technical quality of the field of conflicts law
makes it quite intimidating to some. As the esteemed
Judge Weinstein, the Federal District Court judge
who has handled the Agent Orange litigation as well
as numerous other intractable mass tort cases, from
breast implants to tobacco lawsuits, once famously
said: “If I want the parties to settle a dispute I say
‘Hmm … there must be a conflict of laws issue
in this question.’” Yet, the very technical quality of
the conflicts approach provides a much needed
vocabulary, a register for moving beyond overt politics
in the discussion of international financial regulation.
I’m interested in what the conflicts approach can do
in the sphere of financial regulation precisely because
it transforms political questions into technical legal
issues that can be managed within the scope of the
existing national law.
For the present, one could think of the conflicts
approach as an alternative form of global regulation
prior to our achieving the utopian ideal of pure
international integration. In an interview with Risk

Magazine, Barney Reynolds, a partner at Sherman
& Sterling London working in this area has argued:
“I don’t think in our lifetimes you’ll get a global
insolvency regime, but you might get a global
agreement on a ‘conflict of laws and regulation’
rule, so as to determine which country’s insolvency
regime takes precedence in certain situations.”
In my opinion, there are many appealing advantages
to this approach over the G20 model of full legal
harmonization. From a legal standpoint, paying
attention to the rules and processes that should
govern the allocation of regulatory authority among
overlapping sovereign states is hardly a second best
option for mitigating the harm of regulatory arbitrage.
First and foremost, conflict of laws takes an agonistic
view of the claim that there is a single overarching
“right answer” to what the rules of regulation should
be. The doctrines of conflict of laws instruct judges
always to be aware that their own perspective is
situated and partial, and that a judge in another
jurisdiction could and most likely would think of
the dispute in different terms. This built-in pluralism
contrasts with a significant weakness of the G20’s
efforts at global financial regulatory harmonization
– its tendency to fall into North Atlantic cliquishness.
Secondly, the conflicts approach is case driven.
It builds coordination from the ground up rather
than from top down. Cases are presented to
courts as they develop, which allows problems
to be addressed immediately, rather than wait for
long-term harmonization. This has the added benefit
of allowing for greater participation in the process

of generating consensus, since cases are defined
and argued by the litigants themselves, through
their established local legal representatives who
need not act in an internationally unified manner.
Thirdly, in contrast to substantive financial regulatory
standards that must be painstakingly decided,
there exists considerable agreement on the formal
rules of both private international law and conflict of
laws. Some differences of philosophy are present
between the American approach through common
law and that of civil law. But on the whole, a great
deal is already shared.
Last but certainly not least, the switch to thinking in
terms of conflict of laws does not require new legislation.
Nor does it need new agreements be hammered out
at global conferences among regulators. Implementing
a conflicts approach requires nothing more forceful
than the creative application of laws that are already
part of the legal system of all of the nations in which
major financial centres are found.
So why hasn’t conflict of laws been
pursued in financial regulation? The explanation
is what Gillian Tett calls “silo thinking”: specialists on
the conflict of laws have been traditionally confined
to cases on inheritance, marriage, land disputes,
private contracts and the like because historically
those were the problems that crossed borders. As
people migrated, and emerging European states
had to determine which law would govern various
aspects of these migrants’ lives. In those days,
transnational economic relations were confined to
such issues as mercantile agreements (contracts).
This is why conflicts experts are trained to handle
problems in private shipping contracts, but they
know very little about financial regulation. For their
part, financial regulation experts know next to
nothing about the conflict of laws, if they are even
aware it exists.

s
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Application
What should determine the
extraterritorial reach of US law?

L

et’s consider a controversial example to see
how a financial regulator might use conflict of
laws thinking in determining whether or not
a certain transaction or a certain party, should be
subject to their regulatory authority.

In Europe and Asia, regulators are concerned
with the so-called “extraterritorial reach” of the
proposed regulations of the US Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which has
indisputable authority over the US over-the-counter
(OTC) swap markets under the Dodd-Frank Act.
What then should determine the CFTC’s
extraterritorial reach? The agency has taken an
interesting approach that in some way exemplifies
the promise and the challenge of the conflict of laws
approach. It has proposed that any transactions
with US persons shall be subject to US law and
regulation. Note the technical legal sophistication
of this position; it focuses on particular transactions
and particular subjects (persons). This shifts the
debate from a political question into a technical
one: What is a US person?
On behalf of industry, the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has proposed
a highly formalistic rule: A US person should be
an institution whose principal place of business
is in the US.
This is the old Basel I principle of “home country
oversight” according to which US banks, including
their foreign branches, are subject to US regulation,
while US branches of foreign financial institutions
are not. It is formalistic because it piggy-backs
on a formal legal definition of territory and place

of incorporation. It is also narrow. In this definition,
a free-standing corporation based in the Cayman
Islands, all of whose shares are held by a US entity
would not qualify as a US institution.
What is most important to the industry is the
formal rule-like quality of ISDA’s proposal
because arbitrage, financial or legal, feeds on
clear categories. You can only find arbitrage
opportunities when you can see clear differences
between assets or regulatory authorities. In other
words, it is more important to the industry to
be absolutely certain that US law will not apply
somewhere else – so that transactions can be
confidently booked or financial entities established,
outside the US.
In contrast, public advocacy groups such as
Americans for Financial Reform have proposed a
highly functional definition of a US institution. In their
view, a US institution is any institution whose failure
would substantially impact the US economy. The
functional approach of advocacy groups strikes
fear in the heart of foreign regulators because of
its breadth and hence the potential for overlap
between US and foreign regulatory authority.
To date, the CFTC has responded in a highly
technocratic way. According to one prong of
the CFTC’s complex proposal, a foreign branch
of a US financial institution will qualify as a US
institution, but a foreign subsidiary of a US financial
institution will not. Note that industry can live with
this distinction since it is often possible, using
sophisticated legal technologies, to reproduce
many of the functions of a foreign branch in the
form of a foreign subsidiary.

But there is another piece to the CFTC proposal
which is more innovative and controversial. The
CFTC has further proposed that foreign institutions
that transact with such “US persons” can apply,
on an individual, institution by institution basis, for
exemption from US regulation based on the fact
that they are already in compliance with a body of
foreign regulation that is functionally analogous to
US law. This is called “substituted compliance”.
What is new about the CFTC proposal is that
substituted compliance will be determined, firm by
firm, rather than by country. Thus, one Japanese
bank may qualify while another may not. This
has ruffled the feathers of foreign regulators
who see the legal test as an infringement on
their national sovereignty. If Japanese regulators
have determined that two of their banks are in
compliance with Japanese regulation, who is the
CFTC to judge them differently?
But the creative insight of the conflicts approach is
precisely that of handling problems case by case.
In fact, the conflicts perspective would take the
matter one important step further. The question
of whether a financial institution is or is not a US
person or of whether a foreign institution should or
should not be entitled to substituted compliance
depends not solely upon the status of the person,
but upon the legal issue at stake in the case.
The conflicts approach asks: “What turns on this
legal distinction?” Are we determining, for example,
whether the parties need to post a certain size
margin? Or whether US anti-fraud provisions of
Dodd-Frank should apply?

The third step is for the regulator to ask, “Is there
potential for US taxpayer liability such that the US
has an interest in applying its law?” The answer
again is clearly, ‘Yes’. If this subsidiary of a US
institution gets into financial trouble, the liability will
flow back to the US and ultimately to US taxpayers.

This is obviously very different from the formalist
approach to the scope of national law. What is
perhaps less obvious is how the conflicts approach
also differs from the functional test for determining
which entities will be subject to US regulation,
proposed by public advocacy groups.
In order to see how it is different, let’s make our
hypothetical example even more specific. Imagine
a simple swap transaction between a subsidiary
of a US institution located in a foreign country and
an institution in that country. Is the subsidiary a US
person for purposes of margin rules? There are
many technical steps that the conflicts approach
would go through to answer this question, but we
only need to work through one to have the gist of
a conflicts analysis.
Take the step called “interest analysis”. As the
name suggests this is a technical approach to the
question, “What is really at stake in this choice?
What interests are involved?” In the case of our
swap transaction, the conflicts doctrine directs the
regulator to ask, “What are the purposes behind
this margin rule?” As it turns out, the Commodity
Exchange Act as revised by Dodd-Frank is quite
clear on this point. The purpose of the rule is to avoid
future taxpayer bailouts by ensuring that financial
institutions bear the cost of their risky behaviour.
The conflicts approach would then query, “What is
the relevant contact that would determine whether
this interest legitimately comes into play in this case?”
Here again, a clear answer emerges. The relevant
contact is the potential for US taxpayer liability.

But that is only the first prong of the analysis. The
conflicts approach would then direct the regulator to
go through the same thought process with respect
to the other jurisdiction that might apply its law.
Instead of resorting to a functional decision about
whether US law applies, it recognizes the existence
of other regulatory authorities. It acknowledges
that defining the scope of extraterritorial authority
is really a question of how to share authority with
another regulator.
In our example, the other possible regulatory
authority would be the foreign jurisdiction where
the subsidiary and the foreign financial institution
were located and where the transaction is taking
place. Now let’s imagine the foreign jurisdiction
has its own margin rule with largely the same
purpose. The US regulator could determine there
is no substantial conflict between US and foreign
law. Hence the US can and should go ahead and
apply its law.
But let’s change the facts just a little bit: imagine that
the foreign regulatory authority has no comparable
margin rule, but the transaction is booked in a third
jurisdiction. In this case, the regulator should ask,
“Why did this foreign jurisdiction choose not to have
a margin rule like ours?” After some comparative
investigation he or she might determine that
policy-makers in the foreign jurisdiction were more
concerned about attracting business than they were
about protecting national taxpayers. But since the
transaction in question is actually occurring in a third
jurisdiction and is arguably not bringing business to
the foreign jurisdiction we can conclude the foreign
jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in applying
its law. By this reasoning, the US regulator should
proceed with the determination that the transaction
involves a “US person” and hence is subject to US
margin rules.
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Now try a third fact pattern: let’s imagine there is
no regulation comparable to the Dodd-Frank Act
in the foreign jurisdiction where the transaction
occurs. If both jurisdictions are legitimately
interested, the regulator will have to resort to
some tie-breaking principles. It could perhaps
negotiate with foreign counterparties.
We have walked through only one small piece
of a proper conflicts analysis. Nevertheless, this
extreme simplification is enough to highlight the
key advantage of such an approach: it transforms
a highly political determination into a technical legal
one. In so doing it forces a serious, albeit technical
inquiry, into the relative interests of each jurisdiction
whose laws may apply in a given case. This strikes
me as a viable alternative means of coordinating
and reaching compromise between international
regulatory authorities.
Most importantly, a conflicts approach to transnational
regulatory coordination makes regulatory arbitrage far
more difficult and expensive, and hence reduces the
amount of regulatory arbitrage that will occur. When
legal analysis is issue-specific (instead of imposed by
arbitrary rules) the cost of regulatory arbitrage goes
up dramatically because regulatory arbitrageurs
cannot simply produce and mass market one size
fits all arbitrage products. Regulatory arbitrage
will always be a possibility in some cases, but the
additional cost of legal analysis and therefore the
cost of prediction will eliminate many opportunities.
This is a medium-sized, but important victory for
transnational regulatory cooperation.
Annelise Riles is the Jack G
Clarke Professor of Law in Far
East Legal Studies and Professor
of Anthropology at Cornell
University. Her most recent book
is Collateral knowledge (2011),
University of Chicago Press.
Adapted by Martha Poon, R&R Editor.
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